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1 Introduction
In the 1950s, Simon and his associates
described creative behaviour as a peculiar
search and implemented this view using a
computer program (Newell, Shaw and Simon
1962). On the other hand, creativity has also
been examined within a social/cultural
framework (Csikszentmihalyi 1986; 1988). In
some sense, the two views regarding the same
enterprise, creativity, are conflicting. In this
paper, I attempt to come up with a broader
framework for understanding creativity by
distinguishing different levels of creativity,
namely personal and social/cultural creativity,
and their interaction. Within this framework,
the possible role that the computer can play
is discussed. Moreover, given this framework,
the emergence of subshapes (Mitchell 1993;
Stiny 1993; Liu 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, in press;
Gero and Yan 1993; Gero 1995) in relation to
the emergence of creativity becomes clearer.
2 Kinds of Creativity
Creativity is still one of the most mysterious
subjects in human cognition. Academically,
researchers have applied many fields to the
study of creativity, including the psychometric,
cognitive, biological, and social/cultural
approaches (Sternberg 1988; Health 1993;
Gero and Maher 1993). As stated above, the
major gap between Simon’s and
Csikszentmihalyi’s approaches to creativity is
that they address different scopes of creativity.
Simon focused on the personal level, whereas
Csikszentmihalyi pays much more attention
to the social/cultural level of creativity.
Therefore, while Simon tried to answer “what
is creativity,” Csikszentmihalyi seems more
interested in addressing the question of
“where is creativity.” To be able to compare
the conflicting perspectives on creativity
offered by Simon and Csikszentmihalyi, this
paper begins by reviewing Simon’s
observations and computer implementation
on creativity.
2.1  Personal creativity: Simon’s
observations about creativity
In an attempt to answer the fundamental
question what mechanism is involved in
human creative acts, Simon and his associates
(Newell, Shaw and Simon 1962) hypothesised,
at first, that it is “a special kind of problem
solving behaviour.” They then sketched the
satisfying conditions for problem-solving of
this sort, to be called creativity:
• the product of thinking has novelty and
value for the thinker or his culture;
• the thinking is unconventional;
• it requires high motivation and persistence;
and
• the problem as initially posed was ill-
defined, so that part of the task was to
formulate the problem itself (Newell, Shaw
and Simon 1962).
Simon and his colleagues simulated scientific
discoveries in the computer programs Logic
Theorist (Newell, Shaw and Simon 1962) and
BACON (Langley et al. 1987), and found that
when the correct heuristics and initial data are
available, those programs successfully induced
Whitehead and Russell’s Principia
Mathematica, Newton’s law, Kepler’s third law,
Galileo’s law, and Ohm’s law. The given
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heuristics, in the form of IF-THEN rules, play
critical role in both computer systems. It is fair
to say, at least for Simon, that those discoveries
were achieved when the scientists applied
sensible and critical heuristics in drawing
inferences from given data.
With respect to problem formulation and
originality, Simon admitted that those
computer programs relied on programmers
to provide significant problems and simply
solve the given problems (Newell, Shaw and
Simon 1962, p 147). In sum, according to
Simon’s theory, human creativity is a specific
class of ill-defined problem-solving
characterised by novelty, unconventionality,
persistence, and difficulty in problem
formulation.
2.2 Social/cultural creativity:
Csikszentmihalyi’s differing view
In his paper on motivation and creativity,
Csikszentmihalyi (1986; 1988) strongly
criticised Simon’s idea of creativity and those
computer programs. His argument has three
points:
• According to Einstein and Infeld’s (1938)
insight about scientific discovery, the
critical issue of creativity is problem-
finding, not problem-solving.
• According to Getzels’ (1964) definition of
discovered problem-solving, the problem,
the method, and the correct solution are
all unknown.
• Recognising the solution and proving it to
others are the most difficult parts in
creativity.
Almost utterly denying Simon’s ideas and
programs on creativity based on the above
viewpoints, Csikszentmihalyi instead came up
with a dynamic framework of creativity
composed of three major elements—person,
field, and domain—as shown in Figure 1
(Csikszentmihalyi 1988).
This ‘map’ shows the interrelations of the
three systems that jointly determine the
occurrence of a creative idea, object, or
action. The individual takes some
information provided by the culture and
transform it, and if the change is deemed
valuable by society, it will be included in
the domain, thus providing a new starting
point for the next generation of persons.
The actions of all three systems are
necessary for creativity to occur
(Csikszentmihalyi (1988, pp. 329).
Within the  'person' element, Csikszentmihalyi
(1986, 1988) broadly but very abstractly
mentioned that motivational, affective,
cognitive and demographic variables and early
experience are key issues to use when
examining human creative behaviour.
3 Re-examining Creativity
Both models provided by Simon and
Csikszentmihalyi seem to capture some of the
essence of creativity, however there is still
some ambiguity when people interpret
Simon’s creativity as a problem-solving. Before
discussing the distinctions between Simon and
Csikszentmihalyi and trying to integrate the
two views, the critical points are what is an ill-
defined problem by Simon’s definition and
how to solve it.
The characterisation of an ill-defined problem
is:
• there is no definite criterion to test a
proposed solution;
• the problem space is not defined, in other
words, the boundaries of the relevant
information are vague; and
• there are no legal moves (Simon 1973,
1978).
transmits structured
information and action
PERSON
genetic pool &
personal experience
FIELD
(social organisation
of DOMAIN)
social system culture
DOMAIN
(information-processing
system or symbol system)
produces variation
retains selected
variance
Figure 1: A dynamic framework of creativity
(after Csikszentmihalyi 1988)
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To solve ill-defined problems, the problem-
solver should decompose the entire problem
into well-defined sub-problems and solve
them individually. The means-ends analysis is
a typical mechanism for solving ill-defined
problems.
3.1 Problem-finding, not problem-solving
Simon did take problem-finding into account
in his theory and also in 'Logic Theorist' and
'BACON'. He claimed that
perhaps the real creativity lies in the
problem selection. . .Logic Theorist has
some power of problem selection. In
working backward from the goal of
proving one theorem, it can conjecture
new theorems—or supposed theorems—
and set up the subgoal of proving these.
(Newell, Shaw and Simon 1962, p 147).
The problem selection process in Logic
Theorist and BACON is quite different from
Csikszentmihalyi’s definition of problem-
finding. For instance, in discovering Newton’s
law, what Csikszentmihalyi expects BACON to
do is to find the initial problem of universal
gravitation by observing an apple  falling.
Unfortunately, BACON is only able to find
other problems or subproblems, although
Simon did emphasise the initial problem-
finding.
3.2  The problem, the method, and the correct
solution are all unknown
Csikszentmihalyi (1986, p. 4) mentioned that
when
Newton solved the problem of universal
gravitation, in most important respect, that
law did not exist to be solved before he
discovered it.
Consequently he argued that, in BACON’s
discovery processes, the initial problem, the
correct heuristics, and the solution are all
known in advance. It is no longer creative. This
reminds me of Marvin Minsky’s joke about
creativity: when creative people simply show
us the outcome, we can view it as creative; if
we observe both the process of doing it and
the outcome, the creativity is gone. This raises
the important question of how we know that,
before he discovered universal gravitation,
Newton did not know the problem, the
method, or the solution. Probably when he
observed the apple fall, he began to find the
problem regarding it. After a long time
thinking, maybe he discovered a concrete
problem to be solved. Having solved that
concrete problem which was only in his mind,
not in ours, Newton in turn began to find a
correct method or heuristics. After a long
period of time spent finding, he obtained
some necessary heuristics. Eventually he
solved the problem by applying those
heuristics to the given data.
Perhaps I imagine too much. Perhaps I am
right. It seems to me that creativity is a huge
ill-defined problem which, using Simon’s
approach, can be decomposed into problem-
finding, heuristics-finding and solution-
finding. The computer programs Logic
Theorist  and BACON contribute to modelling
the third phase in the process of creativity
once the subproblems in the first two phases
are solved. How to find the concrete problem
and how to find the necessary heuristic rules
are two more, separate problem-solving
processes.
3.3 Recognising the solution and proving it
to others
That we cannot recognise its solution is one
typical characteristic of the ill-defined
problem, as mentioned previously. As Simon
(1973) says, for ill-defined problems, the
human problem-solver looks for one of the
satisfying solutions rather than the optimal
one.
There are two levels for recognising the
solution: personal recognition by the creative
person and cultural recognition by other
people. The proposed solution can become
creative only when, first, the person
recognises it as satisfying solution and, second,
he proves it to the world and the world accepts
it and then recognises it as creative.
The first part of the solution recognition can
be achieved more easily by computer. If a
proposal solution can satisfy the constraints
and clearly explain the phenomena of the
given problem, and is original, it can be
recognised as a good and novel solution. The
second part of the solution recognition is very
difficult by computer. But, from my point of
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view, it is not the computer’s responsibility but
that of culture and society.
4 Remodelling Creativity
Based on the above discussion and Simon’s
theory, creativity is not simply either a matter
of problem-solving or an ill-defined case of
problem-solving. Instead, it is a special and
huge ill-defined problem-solving behaviour,
not only composed of problem-finding,
heuristics-finding and solution-finding and
recognition, but also characterised by
motivation, originality and unconventionality.
Does this mean Simon’s theory is complete?
Of course not. From the above discussion, a
person or a computer can propose a solution
and recognise it as a satisfying one. Without
others’ proper recognition, that solution is
simply treated as novelty not creativity. Another
weakness is the question of where the given
data comes from.
Csikszentmihalyi’s (1988) framework of
creativity can fill these slots. He successfully
models an outer framework for creativity but
lacks the inner processes for the three
elements, namely person, field and domain. On
the other hand, Simon’s theory saliently reveals
the cognitive processes of creative behaviour,
the inner system of the person, but lacks an
explanation for the whole contextual
framework in terms of culture and society. Each
can help the other. It is widely agreed that
creative activity includes motivation,
persistence, originality and variation (Newell,
Shaw and Simon 1962; Simon 1966;
Csikszentmihalyi’s 1988; Gardner 1988, 1993;
Hayes 1989; Perkins 1981; Hofstadter 1985;
Minsky 1985). In a broader sense, they are
important parts of the method or heuristic for
problem-solving. I would like to treat them as
domain-general heuristics, that is trying
something new and trying harder. They are
required for the emergence of creativity in any
domain. What is needed is to find domain-
specific heuristics.
4.1 The framework: a dual generate-and-test
model of creativity
It seems to me that, although they both address
issues about creative activities, Simon and
Csikszentmihalyi do not share the same focus:
Simon pays more attention to personal aspects
of creativity, while Csikszentmihalyi is more
concerned with its social/cultural scope. The
distinction between the personal and social/
cultural levels of creativity reminds me of the
terms “small-c” and “big-c” creativity used by
Gardner (1992): many people are (small-c)
creative for themselves, but only a few of them
might be recognised as (big-c) Creative socially
and culturally. For example, every architect
pursues creative works. First, on the personal
level, they must try a great number of
alternatives and finally come up with a creative
solution for themselves. Next, on the social/
cultural level, they must seek national or
international recognition of creativity by
constructing the building, publishing the work,
or even giving lectures and writing books on
the theme. For both personal and social/
cultural levels, creativity “is a patient search”
(Le Corbusier 1960).
Within the personal level, initially, the person
has to find a specific problem to explore and
solve. Using a generate-and-test scheme, the
creator must then go through a cyclic process
of creativity generations and tests until the
proposed solution passes the personal test and
becomes the creative solution for him. Note
that the sources of initial data and knowledge
in the domain, at this level, provide necessary
support for personal creative activity, but they
are stable. The new, creative idea cannot be put
into the body of domain knowledge in the
mean time because it is only in the person’s
mind. To be socially/culturally creative, he
should show the personal creativity he seeks
to the field after he has gone through the
personal creativity generate-and-test
procedures, as shown in Figure 2.
Seeking recognition from a group of
authorised people makes the person a
generator of social/cultural creativity. If the
personal creative solution can pass the social/
cultural creativity test by the field, it becomes
well-known creativity and can be added into
the body of human knowledge in the domain;
otherwise the person must repeat the
Personal
creativity
TEST
Personal
Creativity
GENERATION
Problem
Finding
yes
no
person
to the field
Sources of inital
data and knowledge
in the domain
Domain
Figure2: A model of personal creativity
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personal creativity generate-and-test
procedures for another personally creative
alternative to be tested by the field. Also note
that the source of initial data and knowledge
of the domain is no longer stable; it
dynamically interacts with the other two social/
cultural components and it grows over time,
as shown in Figure 3.
Based on the preceding discussion of personal
and social/cultural creativity, a better-defined
framework of creativity should subsume these
two levels of activities characterised by the
person, the field, and the domain. Therefore,
a dual generate-and-test model of creativity is
diagrammed as illustrated in Figure 4.
Figure 4: The Framework- A dual generate-
and-test model of creativity
5 Conclusion: Implications for CAAD
systems
From the implications of Simon’s research,
people can subjectively pursue personal
creative behaviour which can also possibly be
replicated by a computer system that has
incorporated some initial data and heuristic
function towards creativity. At this personal
level of creativity, novelty and other choices
can be acquired from both knowledge
transforming search and shape restructuring
search. On the other hand, from the
implication of Csikszentmihalyi’s research, the
emergence of creativity is also a social/cultural
activity within which a computer system can
hardly participate.
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